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Multiculturalism, Interculturalism and Citizenship 
 
Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter we engage with some recent authors who believe that an alternative to 
multiculturalism must be sought in order to understand and live with diversity. These 
authors are not anti-diversity, on the contrary, but they share the view that multiculturalism 
is no longer a persuasive intellectual or policy approach.  For example, the Council of 
(XURSH¶V :KLWH 3DSHU RQ ,QWHUFXOWXUDO 'LDORJXH  LQFOXGHG WKH ILQGLQJ WKDW WKH
majority of practitioners and NGOs across Europe had come to the conclusion that 
multiculturalism was no longer fit for purpose, and needed to be replaced by a form of 
interculturalism. Similar views were expressed in the UNESCO World Report, Investing in 
Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue (2008). More recently still, Ted Cantle (2012: 
 KDV GHVFULEHG LQWHUFXOWXUDOLVP µDV DQ RSSRUWXQLW\ WR UHSODFH PXOWLFXOWXUDOLVP DV D
FRQFHSWXDO DQG SROLF\ IUDPHZRUN¶ ZKLOH 0D[ZHOO et al (2012: 429) maintain that 
µ,QWHUFXOWXUDOLVP UHSUHVHQWV D JDLQ RYHU 0XOWLFXOWXUDOLVP ZKLOH SXUVXLng the same set of 
PRVW XQFRQWURYHUVLDO SROLWLFDO HQGV«¶  7KHVH VWDWHPHQWV WKHUHIRUH LQYLWH WKH TXHVWLRQ in 
what ways ± if at all - is interculturalism different, substantively or otherwise, from 
multiculturalism?   
 
Is it merely the case, as Lentin (2005: 394) has suggested, that interculturalism is an 
µXSGDWHGYHUVLRQ¶RIPXOWLFXOWXUDOLVP",IVRZKDWLVEHLQJµXSGDWHG¶",IQRWLQZKDWZD\V± 
if at all - is interculturalism different, substantively or otherwise, from multiculturalism?  
                                                          
 This chapter uses materials from Meer and Modood (2011) and Meer and Modood (2014).  
We are grateful to Routledge and to the European Council for reproducing these here and 
would also like to thank Geoff Levey, Per Mouritsen and Varun Uberoi for their very helpful 
comments on earlier drafts. 
With a specific focus on the political, in this chapter we tentatively sketch out and critically 
evaluate four ways in which conceptions of intercultrualism are being positively contrasted 
with multiculturalism (while these four positive evaluations of interculturalism overlap we 
also consider them to be sufficiently distinct to be discussed separately). These are, firstly, as 
something greater than co-existence, in that interculturalism is allegedly more geared 
toward interaction and dialogue than multiculturalism. Secondly, that interculturalism is 
FRQFHLYHGDVVRPHWKLQJOHVV µJURXSLVW¶RUPRUH\LHOGLQJRIV\QWKHVLVWKDQPXOWLFXOWXUDOLVP
Thirdly, that interculturalism is something more committed to a stronger sense of the whole, 
in terms of such things as societal cohesion and national citizenship. Finally, that where 
multiculturalism may be illiberal and relativistic, interculturalism is more likely to lead to 
criticism of illiberal cultural practices (as part of the process of intercultural dialogue). 
 
It is important to register at the outset that the chapter is concerned with what we 
XQGHUVWDQG DV  µSROLWLFDO LQWHUFXOWXUDOLVP¶ E\ ZKLFK ZH PHDQ WKH ZD\V LQ ZKLFK
interculturalism is appropriated in the critique of multiculturalism (Booth, 2003, Sze and 
Powell, 2004; Wood, Landry and Bloomfield, 2006), in a manner that is not necessarily 
endorsed by wider advocates of interculturalism (in a situation not dissimilar to how western 
feminism (Moller Okin, 1999) may be appropriated in the critique non-western cultures (cf. 
Phillips, 2007; Malik, 2008)).  Moreover, the purpose of this chapter is not to offer a 
comprehensive account of the topic, but to provide an entry point in developing a discussion, 
especially in relation to multiculturalism and interculturalism as frameworks for political 
relations in a context of cultural diversity.  To do this satisfactorily we need first to elaborate 
something of our understanding of the intellectual character of multiculturalism, and it is to 
this that we now turn. 
 
Liberalism and multiculturalism 
 
To some commentators the staple issues that multiculturalism seeks to address, such as the 
rights of ethnic and national minorities, group representation, and perhaps even the political 
claims-PDNLQJ RI µQHZ¶ VRFLDO PRYHPHQWV DUH LQ IDFW µIDPLOLDU ORQJ-standing problems of 
SROLWLFDO WKHRU\ DQG SUDFWLFH¶ .HOO\   ,QGHHG VRPH KROG WKLV YLHZ WR WKH SRLQW RI
frustration:  
 
If we take a very broad definition of multiculturalism so that it simply corresponds to the 
demand that cultural diversity be accommodated, there is no necessary conflict between it 
DQG OLEHUDOLVP >«@ %XW PRVW PXOWLFXOWXUDOLVWV ERDVW WKDW WKH\ DUH LQQRYDWRUV LQ SROLWLFDO
philosophy by virtue of having shown that liberalism cannot adequately satisfy the 
requirements of equal treatment and justice under conditions of cultural diversity (Barry, 
2002: 205). 
 
7KH ILUVW SDUW RI %DUU\¶V VWDWHPHQW LV SHUKDSV PRUH FRQFLOLDWRU\ WKDQ PLJKWEH DQWLFLSDWHG
from an author admired for his argumentative robustness and theoretical hostility toward 
multiculturalism; while the second part poses more of an empirical question.  Beginning 
ZLWKWKHILUVWSDUW%DUU\¶VYLHZLVE\QRPHDQVUHMHFWHGE\WKRVHHQJDJHGLQWKHµPXOWLFXOWXUDO
WXUQ¶. Modood (2007a: 8), for instance, locates the genesis of multiculturalism within a 
µPDWUL[RISULQFLSOHVWKDWDUHFHQWUDOWRFRQWHPSRUDU\OLEHUDOGHPRFUDFLHV¶LQDPDQQHUWKDW
HVWDEOLVKHVPXOWLFXOWXUDOLVPDVµWKHFKLOGRIOLEHUDOHJDOLWDULDQLVPEXWOLNHDQ\FKLOGLWLVQRW
simply a faithful reproduction of its pareQWV¶$QRWKHUZD\RISXWWLQJWKLVLVWRVWDWHWKDWas a 
concept, multiculturalism is a partial outgrowth of liberalism in that it establishes µD WKLUG
generation norm of legitimacy, namely respect for reasonable cultural diversity, which needs 
to be considered on a par with the [first and second generation] norms of freedom and 
HTXDOLW\ DQG VR WR PRGLI\ SROLFLHVRI µIUHH DQG HTXDO WUHDWPHQW¶ DFFRUGLQJO\¶ 7XOO\ 
102).   
 
Our interest in this chapter LV WKH SROLWLFDO LPSOLFDWLRQ RI WKLV µWKLUG JHQHUDtion norm of 
OHJLWLPDF\¶IRUDFRQFHSWRIFLWL]HQVKLSZKLFKLQFOXGHVWKH recognition that social life consists 
of individuals and groups, and that both need to be provided for in the formal and informal 
distribution of powers; not just in law, but in representation in the offices of the state, public 
committees, consultative exercises, and access to public fora. This means that while 
individuals have rights, mediating institutions such as trade unions, churches, 
neighbourhoods, immigrant associations and so on may also be encouraged to be active 
public players and fora for political discussion (and may even have a formal representative or 
administrative role to play in the state).  One implication of this recognition means the re-
forming national identity and citizenship, and offering an emotional identity with the whole to 
counterbalance the emotional loyalties to ethnic and religious communities (Modood 2007a).   
 
7RZKDWH[WHQWWKHQWRZHKDYHDQHVWDEOLVKHGµFDQRQ¶RIPXOWLFXOWXUDOLVPDVDQ intellectual 
ideal - one that persuasively distinguishes it from varieties of liberalism?  It is certainly the 
case that theoretically there are three established policy related strands of multiculturalism. 
One derives from radical social theory, especially uses of Derrida, and finds ideological 
H[SUHVVLRQLQFULWLTXHVRI(XURFHQWULVP$IURFHQWULVPDQGWKHZDUVRYHUµWKHFDQRQ¶ LQWKH
US universities in the 1980s.  Another focuses on popular culture, everyday cultural 
interaction and the resulting hybridity and mixedness (Gilroy 2000), though the policy 
LPSOLFDWLRQVRIVXFK µPXOWLFXOWXUH¶DUHXVXDOO\HOXVLYH0HHUDQG0RGRRG, 2009a). It is the 
third strand, however, which is the focus of our interest, and which grows out of policy 
developments, with Canada supplying one of the maturest examples, and, pioneered by Will 
Kymlicka, is best expressed in engagements with liberal political theory.  
 
This relationship to liberalism of this third strand of multiculturalism is a pertinent issue 
because it compels us to explore something of the provenance of multiculturalism as an 
intellectual tradition, with a view to assessing the extent to which its origins continues to 
shape its contemporary public µLGHQWLW\¶:HPLJKWUHDVRQDEO\DVNWKLVWRLGHQWLI\WKHH[WHQW
to which some of the criticism of multiculturalism is rooted in an objection to earlier 
formulations that displayed precisely those elements deemed unsatisfactory when compared 
with interculturalism e.g., that multiculturalism is more likely to be essentialist, illiberal, less 
agency-oriented, and less concerned with unity. 
 Before proceeding with this line of inquiry, it seems only reasonable offer the intellectual 
health warning that multiculturalism as a concept is ± like very many others ± µSRO\VHPLF¶
such that multiculturalist authors cannot be held entirely responsible for the variety of ways 
it which the term is interpreted.  This is something noted by Bhabha (1998: 31) who points to 
the tendency for multiculturalism to be appropriated DV D µSRUWPDQWHDX WHUP¶ RQH WKDW
encapsulates a variety of sometimes contested meanings (cf Meer and Modood, 2011). In this 
respect the idea RI PXOWLFXOWXUDOLVP PLJKW EH VDLG WR KDYH D µFKDPHOHRQLF¶ TXDOLW\ WKDW
facilitates its simultaneous adoption and rejection in the critique or defence of a position 
(Smith, 2010).   
 
One illustration of this is the manner in which multiculturalism is simultaneously used as a 
label to describe the fact of pluralism or diversity in any given society, and a moral stance 
that cultural diversity is a desirable feature of a given society (as well as the different types of 
ways in which the state could recognise and support it). Moreover, in both theoretical and 
policy discourses, multiculturalism means different things in different places. In North 
America, for example, multiculturalism encompasses discrete groups with territorial claims, 
such as the Native Peoples and the Quebecois, even though these groups want to be treated 
DV µµQDWLRQV¶¶ ZLWKLQ D PXOWLQDWLRQDO VWDWH UDWKHU WKDQ PHUHO\ DV HWKQRFXOWXUDO JURXSV LQ D
mononational state (Kymlicka 1995). Indeed, in Europe, while groups with such claims, like 
the Catalans and the Scots, are thought of as nations, multiculturalism has a more limited 
meaning, referring to a post-immigration urban mélange and the politics it gives rise to. One 
outcome is that while in North America language-based ethnicity is seen as the major 
SROLWLFDO FKDOOHQJH LQ :HVWHUQ (XURSH WKH FRQMXQFWLRQ RI WKH WHUPV µµLPPLJUDWLRQ¶¶ DQG
µµFXOWXUH¶¶ QRZ QHDUO\ DOZD\V LQYRNHV WKH ODUJH QHZO\ VHWWOHG 0XVOLP SRSXODWLRQV
Sometimes, usually in America, political terms such as multiculturalism and µµUDLQERZ
FRDOLWLRQ¶¶DUHPHDQWWRLQFOXGHDOOJURXSVPDUNHGE\µµGLIIHUHQFH¶¶DQGKLVWRULFH[FOXVLRQVXFK
as women and gays (Young 1990).   
 Some have turned to this variety in meaning and usage of the term as an explanation of the 
DOOHJHGO\ µZLGHO\ divergent assessments of the short history and potential future of 
PXOWLFXOWXUDOLVP¶.LYLVWRDQG)DLVWDQGLWLVWRWKHVHGLIIHUHQWPHDQLQJVDQGWKH
contexts that generated them to which we now turn. 
 
Forging multicultural citizenship 
 
The terPµPXOWLFXOWXUDOLVP¶ HPHUJHG LQ WKHV DQG V LQ FRXQWULHV OLNH &DQDGD DQG
Australia, and to a lesser extent in Britain and the United States (where it was initially 
limited to the field of education). As we have already noted, in the case of Canada the focus 
was from the start on constitutional and land issues, in a way that informed definitions of 
nationhood and related to unresolved legal questions concerning the entitlements and status 
of indigenous peoples, not to mention the further issue of the rise of a nationalist and 
secessionist movement in French-speaking Quebec.   
 
At the outset in both Canada and Australia multiculturalism was often presented as an 
DSSOLFDWLRQRIµOLEHUDOYDOXHV¶LQWKDWPXOWLFXOWXUDOLVPLQWKHVHFRXQWULHV extended individual 
freedoms and substantiated the promise of equal citizenship.  As evidence of this position, 
.\POLFNDDSRLQWV WRWKHWKHQ&DQDGLDQ3ULPH0LQLVWHU3LHUUH(OOLRW7UXGHDX¶V
speech on the iimplementation of a bilingual framework (a pre-cursor to the later 
0XOWLFXOWXUDO $FW ,Q WKLV 7UXGHDX SURPLVHG WKDW µD SROLF\ RI PXOWLFXOWXUDOLVP ZLWKLQ D
bilingual framework is basically the conscious support of individual freedom of choice. We 
DUH IUHH WR EH RXUVHOYHV¶ 7UXGHDX    ,Q .\POLFND¶V (2005a: 2) reading this 
statement reflected the natural outgrowth of the liberalization of Canadian social legislation 
in the period between the Bill of Rights of Rights (1960) and Charter of Rights (1982), 
EHFDXVH µWKH IXQGDPHQWDO LPSXOVHV EHKLQG WKH SROLcy were the liberal values of individual 
freedom and equal citizenship on a non-GLVFULPLQDWRU\EDVLV¶ 
 While similar observations might be made in relation to Australia, they could only be so in so 
IDU LW UHIOHFWHG µHVVHQWLDOO\D OLEHUDO LGHRORJ\ZKLFK operates within liberal institutions with 
WKHXQLYHUVDODSSURYDORIOLEHUDODWWLWXGHV¶-XSSTXRWHGLQ.\POLFNDLELG7KLV
is because in contrast with Canada, Australian multiculturalist policy developed more as a 
means to better integrate new immigrants, by easing the expectations of rapid assimilation.1  
Initially, as Levey (2008) elaborates, the policy did not include Indigenous Australians until 
the end of the 1970s with Galbally Report (1978), which spoke of multiculturalism being a 
poliF\IRUµDOO$XVWUDOLDQV¶including Indigenous Australians.2  
 
This kind of multiculturalism nevertheless simultaneously encompassed the recognition of 
discrete groups with territorial claims, such as the Native Peoples and the Quebeckers, even 
WKRXJK WKHVH JURXSV ZDQWHG WR EH WUHDWHG DV µQDWLRQV¶ ZLWKLQ D PXOWLQDWLRQal state, rather 
than as minority groups in a mononational state.  In reconciling these political claims to a 
SROLWLFDOWKHRU\RIOLEHUDOLVP.\POLFND¶VRZQLQWHOOHFWXDOZRUNLVUHIOHFWLYHRIKRZDQ
early theorization of liberal multiculturalism was developing. This is because Kymlicka 
proposed group differentiated rights for three types of minorities comprising indigenous 
SHRSOHV µVXEVWDWH¶ QDWLRQDO PLQRULWLHV DQG LPPLJUDQW JURXSV 7KH JHQHUDO SULQFLSOHV
common to the each of these different types of minorities, he argued, included, firstly, that 
the state must be seen as belonging equally to all citizens.  Secondly, individuals should be 
able to access state institutions, and act as full and equal citizens in political life, without 
having to hide or deny their cultural identity.  Thirdly, the state should acknowledge the 
µKLVWRULFLQMXVWLFH¶GRQHWRPLQRULW\QRQ-dominant) groups. He interpreted these principles 
                                                          
1 We are very grateful to Geoff Levey for alerting to the nuances of the inception of Australian 
multiculturalism.   
2 This inclusiveness was formalized in the first national multicultural policy, National 
Agenda for a Multicultural Australia, under the Hawke Labor govt in 1989. It has been 
retained in every subsequent version. However, while Indigenous Australians are formally 
included, the policy also states that their situation is distinct and requires its own special 
treatment and set of measures (as a consequence many Indigenous leaders themselves reject 
multiculturalism as being relevant to them and indeed as undercutting their special status as 
First Peoples). See Levey (2008). 
to mean that national and indigenous minorities were entitled to territorial autonomy and 
separate political representation, while migration based groups, who were assumed to have 
QR UHODWLRQVKLS WR WKH FRXQWU\SULRU WR PLJUDWLRQ ZHUH HQWLWOHG RQO\ WR µSRO\HWKQLF ULJKWV¶
namely full civic integration that respected their cultural identities. 
 
2XWVLGH RI &DQDGD LQ WKH 86 8. DQG ODWHU WKH 1HWKHUODQGV UHVSHFWLYHO\ .\POLFND¶V
distinction between national minority rights and polyethnic rights was not easily transposed.   
On the one hand, multiculturalism in the contexts mostly comprised of µSRO\HWKQLFLW\¶ WKH
policy focus was more likely to be concerned with schooling the children of 
Asian/black/Hispanic post-/neocolonial immigrants, and multiculturalism in these 
instances meant the extension of the school, both in terms of curriculum and as an 
LQVWLWXWLRQWRLQFOXGHIHDWXUHVVXFKDVµPRWKHU-WRQJXH¶WHDFKLQJQRQ-Christian religions and 
holidays, halal food, Asian dress, and so on.   On the other hand, the citizenship regimes in 
European countries included historical relationships with former colonial subjects that were 
distinct from the citizenship regimes of settler nations.  For example, the 1948 British 
Nationality Act granted freedom of movement to all formerly or presently dependent, and 
now Commonwealth, territories (irrespective of whether their passports were issued by 
LQGHSHQGHQWRUFRORQLDOVWDWHVE\FUHDWLQJWKHVWDWXVRIµ&LWL]HQVKLSRIWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP
DQG&RORQLHV¶&8.&8QWLOWKH\DFTXLUHGRQHRURWKHURIWKHQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQVKLSVLQWKHVH
post-colonial countries, these formerly British subjects continued to retain their British 
status.  Thus, post-colonial migrants to Britain clearly were not historic minorities, but nor 
were they without historic claims upon Britain and so constituted a category that did not fit 
Kymlicka¶VFDWHJRULHVRIPXOWLFXOWXUDOFLWL]HQV 
 
1HYHUWKHOHVV WKH WHUP µPXOWLFXOWXUDOLVP¶ LQ (XURSH FDPH WR PHDQ DQG QRZ PHDQV
throughout the English-speaking world and beyond, the political accommodation by the 
state and/or a dominant group of all minority cultures defined first and foremost by 
reference to race,  ethnicity or religion, and, additionally but more controversially, by 
reference to other group-defining characteristics such as nationality and aboriginality.  The 
latter is more controversial not only because it extends the range of the groups that have to 
be accommodated, but also because the larger political claims made by such groups, who 
UHVLVW KDYLQJ WKHVH FODLPV UHGXFHG WR WKRVH RI LPPLJUDQWV +HQFH GHVSLWH .\POLFND¶V
attempt to conceptualise multiculturalism-as-multinationalism, the dominant meaning of 
multiculturalism in politics relates to the claims of post-immigration groups. 
 
This provenance of multiculturalism has bequeathed to its contemporary instantiations the 
importance of reconciling ideas of multiculturalism to ideas of citizenship, within a 
reciprocal balance of rights and responsibilities, assumptions of virtue and conceptions of 
membership or civic status (Meer, 2010). While there is agreement that the membership 
conferred by citizenship should entail equal opportunity, dignity and confidence, different 
views remain about the proper ways, in culturally diverse societies, to confer this civic status. 
7KRVHHQJDJHG LQ WKH µPXOWLFXOWXUDO WXUQ¶ VWLOOPDLQWDLQ WKDW FRQFHSWLRQVRI FLWL]Hnship can 
frequently ignore the sensibilities of minorities marked by social, cultural and political 
differences (May, Modood, and Squires, 2004).  
 
Hence the political PXOWLFXOWXUDOLVPRI0RGRRGIRUH[DPSOHLQVLVWVWKDWµZKHQQHZJURXSV
enter a society, WKHUHKDVWREHVRPHHGXFDWLRQDQGUHILQHPHQWRI«VHQVLWLYLWLHVLQWKHOLJKWRI
FKDQJLQJFLUFXPVWDQFHVDQGWKHVSHFLILFYXOQHUDELOLWLHVRIQHZHQWUDQWV¶$VVXFK
a widely accepted contemporary thrust of what multiculturalism denotes includes a critique 
RI µWKH P\WK RI KRPRJHQHRXV DQG PRQRFXOWXUDO QDWLRQ-VWDWHV¶ &DVWOHV   DQG DQ
DGYRFDF\RI WKH ULJKWRIPLQRULW\ µFXOWXUDOPDLQWHQDQFHDQGFRPPXQLW\ IRUPDWLRQ OLQNLQJ
WKHVHWRVRFLDOHTXDOLW\DQGSURWHFWLRQIURPGLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶LELG 
 
 
Beyond multicultural co-existence, towards intercultural dialogue and 
communication 
 Outside of Canada and North America more broadly, the idea of interculturalism has 
hitherto more commonly featured in Dutch (de Witt, 2010) and German (Miera, 2011) 
accounts of integration, as well as in Spanish and Greek discussion of migrant diversity in 
the arena of education (Gundara, 2000).  Until relatively recently it has been less present in 
British discourses because concepts of race-relations, anti-racism, race-equality, and 
multiculruralism have been more prominent (Gundara and Jacobs, 2000). While its current 
advocates conceive it as something societal and therefore of much broader appeal than in a 
specific commercial usage found in some American formulations (in terms of facilitating 
µFRPPXQLFDWLRQ¶ DFURVV WUDQV-national business and commerce) (Bennett, 1998; Carig, 
1994), what its present formulation perhaps retains from such incarnations is an emphasis 
upon communication.  Indeed, according to Wood, Landry and Bloomfield (2006: 9) 
µFRPPXQLFDWLRQ¶ LV WKH GHIQLQJ FKDUDFWHULVLWLF DQG WKH FHQWUDO PHDQV WKURXJK ZKLFK µan 
intercultural approach aims to facilitate dialogue, exchange and reciprocal understanding 
EHWZHHQSHRSOHRIGLIIHUHQWEDFNJURXQGV¶7KHTXHVtion is to what extent this can be claimed 
as either a unique or distinguishing quality of interculturalism when dialogue and reciprocity 
too are foundational to most, if not all, accounts of multiculturalism.  To put it another way, 
what makes communication unique for interculturalism in a manner that diverges from 
multiculturalism?  According to some advocates, a difference is perceptible in the social or 
FRQYLYLDOµRSHQQHVV¶LQZKLFKFRPPXQLFDWLRQLVIDFLOLWDWHG$V:RRG/DQGU\DQG%ORRPILHOG
(2006: 7) maintain 
 
Multiculturalism has been founded on the belief in tolerance between cultures but 
it is not always the case that multicultural places are open places. Interculturalism 
on the other hand requires openness as a prerequisite and, while openness in itself 
is not the guarantee of interculturalism, it provides the setting for interculturalism 
to develop. 
 
7KHµRSHQQHVV¶RUµFORVHGQHVV¶WKDWWKHDXWKRUVKDYHLQPLQGLVQRWDQHWKLFDORUPRUDOEXWD
sociological concern related to ± if not derived from ± a spatial sense of community and 
settlement as discussed further below.  But it is also an openness of another kind that is not 
more than a few steps away from what Smith (2004) characterizes as models of inter-
religious dialogue. These models come from the North American context, including the 
µ'LDORJXH DV ,QIRUPDWLRQ 6KDULQJ¶ DQG µ'LDORJXH WR &RPH &ORVHU 0RGHO¶ ZKLFK HQFRXUDJH
religious groups to focus on commonalities, in a way that seeks to eschew differences in 
order to elevate mutuality and sharing.  What is striking, however, is the extent to which 
:RRG/DQGU\DQG%ORRPILHOG¶Vcharacterization ignores how central the notions of 
dialogue and communication are to multiculturalism.  This might easily be illustrated with 
reference to some canonical contributions that have provided a great deal of intellectual 
impetus to the advocacy of multiculturalism as a political or public policy movement.  
 
2XU ILUVW H[DPSOH FRXOG EH &KDUOHV 7D\ORU¶V HVVD\ IURP  ZLGHO\ FRQVLGHUHG WR EH D
founding statement of multiculturalism in political theory and in which he characterises the 
emergence of a modern politics of identity premised upon an LGHD RI µUHFRJQLWLRQ¶ 7KH
QRWLRQRIUHFRJQLWLRQDQGLW¶VUHODWLRQVKLSWRPXOWLFXOWXUDOLVPFDQEHDEVWUDFWEXWLVORFDWHG
for Taylor as something that has developed out of a move away from conceiving historically 
defined or inherited hierarchies as the sole provenance of social status (in the French sense 
of préférence), toward a notion of dignity more congruent with the ideals of a democratic 
society or polity, one that is more likely to confer political equality and a full or unimpaired 
civic status upon all its citizens.3   
 
Drawing upon his previous, densely catalogued account of the emergence of the modern self 
(Taylor, 1989), Taylor mapped the political implications of this move onto two cases of 
Equality.  The first is the most familiar and is characterised as a rights-based politics of 
universalism, which offers the prospect of affording equal dignity to all citizens in a polity. 
                                                          
3 Thus making equal recognition an essential part of democratic culture, a point not lost on 
+DEHUPDVZKRDUJXHVWKDWµDFRUUHFWO\XQGHUVWRRGWKHRU\RI>FLWL]HQVKLS@ULJKWV
requires a politics of recognition that protects the individual and the life contexts in which 
his or her iGHQWLW\LVIRUPHG¶ 
The second denotes a politics of difference where the uniqueness of context, history and 
identity are salient and potentially ascendant.  For Taylor, this coupling crystallises the way 
LQ ZKLFK WKH LGHD RI UHFRJQLWLRQ KDV JLYHQ ULVH WR D VHDUFK IRU µDXWKHQWLFLW\¶  7KLV LV
characterised as a move away from the prescriptive universalisms that have historically 
underwritten ideas of the Just or the Right, in favour of the fulfilment and realisation of 
RQH¶VWUXHVHOIRULJLQDOLW\RUZRUWK$FFRUGLQJWR7D\ORUWKHUHIRUHSHRSOHFDQQRORQJHUEH
recognised on the basis of identities determined from their positions in social hierarchies 
alone but, rather, through taking account of the real manner in which people form their 
LGHQWLWLHV7KDWLVWRVD\WKDW7D\ORUHPSKDVLVHVWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIµGLDORJLFDO¶UHODWLRQVKLSV
to argue that it is a mistDNH WR VXJJHVW WKDW SHRSOH IRUP WKHLU LGHQWLWLHV µPRQRORJLFDOO\¶ RU
without an intrinsic dependence upon dialogue with others (see Meer, 2010: 31-56).  As such 
KHPDLQWDLQVWKDWZHDUHµDOZD\VLQGLDORJXHZLWKVRPHWLPHVLQVWUXJJOHDJDLQVWWKHWKLQJV
our VLJQLILFDQWRWKHUVZDQWWRVHHLQXV¶7D\ORU 
 
In this formulation Taylor is openly drawing upon both Hegel and Mead each of whom 
maintained that our idea of ourselves, what we claim to be, and what we really think we are, 
is dependent upon how others come to view us to the extent that our sense of self is 
developed in a continuing dialogue.  Self-consciousness exists only by being acknowledged or 
recognised, and the related implication for Taylor, is that a sense of socio-cultural self-
esteem emerges not only from personal identity, but also in relation to the group in which 
WKLVLGHQWLW\LVGHYHORSHG7KLVLVH[SUHVVHGLQ7D\ORU¶V-26) account as follows: 
 
[O]ur identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the 
misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real 
damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back a 
confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves.  Non recognition or 
misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning some in 
a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being. 
 
This is therefore one illustration of how central a concern with dialogue and communication 
are to multiculturalism too. Let us consider another landmark text on this topic: Bhikhu 
3DUHNK¶V Rethinking Multiculturalism (2000). The central argument here is that cultural 
diversity and social pluralism are of an intrinsic value precisely because they challenge 
people to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their own cultures and ways of life.  He 
explicitly distinguishes his multiculturalism from various liberal and communitarian 
positions. Some of the latter recognise that cultures can play an important role in making 
choices meaningful for their members (Kymlicka, 1995), or play host to the development of 
the self for the members of that culture (Sandel, 1982).  Their argument that culture is 
important for individual group members is well taken but they are less successful in 
explaining why cultural diversity is necessary in itself.  To this Parekh offers the following 
explanation: 
 
Since human capacities and values conflict, every culture realizes a limited range of 
them and neglects, marginalizes and suppresses others.  However rich it may be, no 
culture embodies all that is valuable in human life and develops the full range of 
human possibilities.  Different cultures thus correct and complement each other, 
H[SDQGHDFKRWKHU¶VKRUL]RQRIWKRXJKWDQGDOHUWHDFKRWKHUWRQHZIRUPVRIKXPDQ
fulfillment.  The value of other cultures is independent of whether or not they are 
RSWLRQV IRU XV« LQDVVLPLODEOH RWKHUQHVV FKDOOHQJHV XV LQWHOOHFWXDOO\ DQG PRUDOO\
stretches our imagination, and compels us to recognize the limits of our categories 
of thought (Parekh, 2000: 167). 
 
+LV DUJXPHQW WKDW FXOWXUHV RWKHU WKDQ RQH¶V RZQ KDYH VRPHWKLQJ WR WHDFK XV DQG WKDW
therefore members of minority cultures should be encouraged to cultivate their moral and 
aesthetic insights for humanity as a whole, is largely built upon a prescription of 
intercultural dialogue. Indeed, for both Taylor and Parekh communication and dialogue are 
in different ways integral features to their intellectual and political advocacy of 
multiculturalism, and by implication must necessarily be considered so by those drawing 
upon their work unless a different reading is offered.  The point it that to consider 
multiculturalists who draw upon these and similar formulations as being unconcerned with 
matters of dialogue and communication is to profoundly misread and mischaracterize their 
positions.  
 
 Moreover, even amongst those theorists who do not elaborate a philosophical concept of 
dialogical multiculturalism, dialogue is important at a political level. Whatever their varying 
views about the importance of say entrenched rights, democratic majoritarianism, special 
IRUPVRIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDQGVRRQWKH\DOOVHHPXOWLFXOWXUDOLVPDVWKHJLYLQJRIµYRLFH¶LQWKH
public square to marginalized groups (Young, 1990; Kymlicka, 1995; Tully, 1995; Modood, 
2007a). Specifically, these authors also argue that dialogue is the way to handle difficult 
cases of cultural practices such as clitoridectomy, hate speech, religious dress, gender 
relations and so on (see also Eisenberg (2009) on public assessment of identity claims). So, 
whether it is at a philosophical or a political level, the leading theorists of multiculturalism 
give dialogue a centrality missing in liberal nationalist or human rights or class-based 
approaches ± and missed by interculturalist critics of multiculturalism. The multiculturalists 
DVVXPHKRZHYHUWKDWWKHUHLVDVHQVHLQZKLFKWKHSDUWLFLSDQWVWRDGLDORJXHDUHµJURXSV¶RU
µFXOWXUHV¶DQGWKLVOHDGVXVWRDVHFRQGSRLQWRIDOOHJHGFRQWUDVWZLWKLQWHUFXOWXUDOLVWV 
 
Less groupist and culture bound: more synthesized and interactive 
 
$ UHODWHG PHDQV WKURXJK ZKLFK WKH FRQFHUQ ZLWK µFORVHG¶ FRPPXQLWLHV RU JURXSLQJV WKDW
advocates of interculturalism conceive multiculturalism as giving rise to, takes us to our next 
characterisation of interculturalism contra multiculturalism. This is found in the assertion 
WKDW µRQH RI WKH LPSOLFDWLRQV RI DQ LQWHUFXOWXUDO IUDPHZRUN DV RSSRVHG WR D PXOWLFXOWXUDO
RQH«LVWKDWFXOWXUHLVDFWLQJLQDPXOWL-GLUHFWLRQDOPDQQHU¶+DPPHU7KLVGHSLFWLRQ
of intercultulturaliVPDVIDFLOLWDWLQJDQLQWHUDFWLYHDQGG\QDPLFFXOWXUDOµH[FKDQJH¶LQIRUPVD
consistent line of distinction, as the following two portrayals make clear: 
 
Multiculturalism tends to preserve a cultural heritage, while interculturalism 
acknowledges and enables cultures to have currency, to be exchanged, to circulate, 
to be modified and evolve (Sze and Powell, 2004). 
 
[Interculturalism] is concerned with the task of developing cohesive civil societies 
by turning notions of singular identities into those of multiple ones, and by 
developing a shared and common value system and public culture. In building from 
a deep sharing of differences of culture and experience it encourages the formation 
of interdependencies which structure personal identities that go beyond nations or 
simplified ethnicities (Booth, 2003: 432). 
 
This emphasis is warranted for advocates of interculturalism who maintain that the diversity 
of the locations from where migrants and ethnic minorities herald, gives rise not to a 
creation of communities or groups but to a churning mass of languages, ethnicities, religions 
all cutting across each other and creatLQJ D µVXSHUGLYHUVLW\¶ 9HUWRYHF   $Q
intercultural perspective is better served to facilitate management of these sociological 
realities, it is argued, in a way that can be positively contrasted against a multiculturalism 
that emphasises 
 strong ethnic or cultural identities at the expense of wider cultural exchanges.   
 
Notwithstanding this problematic description of how groups feature in multiculturalism, 
which is challenged in other readings (cf Modood, 2007a), what such characterisations of 
interculturalism ignore are the alternative ways in which political interculturalism is itself 
conceptualised. As stated at the outset, by political interculturalism we refer to ways in which 
interculturalism is appropriated in the critique of multiculturalism (Booth, 2003, Sze and 
Powell, 2004; Wood, Landry and Bloomfield, 2006), in a way that may not necessarily be 
HQGRUVHGE\LQWHUFXOWXUDOLVP¶VDGYRFDWHV 
 
Writing from the Quebec context, Gagnon and Iacovino (2007) are one example of authors 
who contrast interculturalism positively with multiculturalism.  The interesting aspect for 
our discussion is that they do so in a way that relies upon a formulation of groups. They 
proceed by arguing that Quebec has developed a distinctive intercultural political approach 
to diversity that is explicitly in opposition to Federal Canadian multiculturalism. Their 
starting point is that two broad considerations are accepted by a variety of political positions, 
including liberal nationalists, republicans and multiculturalists; indeed by most positions 
except liberal individualism, which they critique and leave to one side. These two 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQVDUHWKDWILUVWO\ µIXOOFLWL]HQVKLSVWDWXVUHTXLUHVWKDWDOOFXOWXUDO LGHQWLWLHVEH
allowed to participate in democratic life equally, without the necessity of reducing 
FRQFHSWLRQVRI LGHQWLW\ WR WKH OHYHORI WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶ LELG   $QGVHFRQGO\ ZLWK
UHVSHFWWRXQLW\µWKHNH\HOHPHQWLVDVHQVHRIFRPPRQSXUSRVHLQSXEOLFPDWWHUV¶µDcentre 
which also serves as a marker of identity in the larger society and denotes in itself a pole of 
DOOHJLDQFHIRUDOOFLWL]HQV¶LELG 
 
For Gagnon and Iacovino, however, Canadian multiculturalism has two fatal flaws, which 
means that it is de facto liberal individualist in practice if not in theory. Firstly, it privileges 
an individualist approach to culture: as individuals or their choices change, the collective 
FXOWXUH PXVW FKDQJH LQ FRQWUDVW 4XHEHF¶V SROLF\ VWDWHV FOHDUO\ WKH QHHG WR UHFRJQLVH WKH
French language as a collective good that requires protection and encouragement (Rocher et 
al, cited in Gagnon and Iacovino 2007: 99). Secondly, Canadian multiculturalism locates 
LWVHOI QRW LQ GHPRFUDWLF SXEOLF FXOWXUH EXW UDWKHU µ>S@XEOLF VSDFH LV EDVHG RQ LQGLYLGXDO
participation via a bLOORIULJKWV¶-111); judges and individual choices, not citizens 
debating and negotiating with each other that become the locus of cultural interaction and 
public multiculturalism. 
 
*DJQRQDQG,DFRYLQR¶VSRVLWLYHDUJXPHQWIRULQWHUFXOWXUDOLVPFDn therefore be expressed in 
the following five stages. Firstly, there should be a public space and identity that is not 
merely about individual constitutional or legal rights. Secondly, this public space is an 
important identity for those who share it and so qualifies and counter-balances other 
identities that citizens value.  Thirdly, this public space is created and shared through 
participation, interaction, debate and common endeavour. Fourthly, this public space is not 
culture-less but nor is it merely WKHµPDMRULW\FXOWXUH¶DOOFDQSDUWLFLSDWHLQLWVV\QWKHVLVDQG
evolution and while it has an inescapable historical character, it is always being remade and 
ought to be remade to include new groups. Fifth and finally, Quebec, and not merely federal 
Canada, is such a public space and so an object to which immigrants need to have 
identification with and integrate into and should seek to maintain Quebec as a nation and 
not just a federal province (the same point may apply in other multi-national states but there 
DUHGLIIHUHQWGHJUHHVDQGYDULDWLRQVRIµPXOWL-QDWLRQDOLVP¶ 
 
This characterisation then is very different to that proposed by Booth (2003), Hammer 
(2004) or Sze and Powell (2004) because it makes a moral and policy case for the 
recognition of relatively distinct sub-state nationalisms. As such it is less concerned with the 
diversity of the locations from where migrants and ethnic minorities herald or the 
µVXSHUGLYHUVLW\¶ WKDW WKLV LV DOOHJHG WR FXOWLYDWH WKHUHLQ  ,WV HPSKDVLV RQ PXOWL-nationalism 
does distinguish it from post-immigration multiculturalism (and post-immigration 
interculturalism) but not multiculturalism per se (cf Kymlicka 1995). Alternative, less macro-
level interculturalism which focuses on neighbourhoods, classroom pedagogy, the funding of 
the arts and so on, on the other hand, seems a-political. As such they are not critiques of 
multiculturalism but a different exercise. 
 
Committed to a stronger sense of whole; national identity and social cohesion 
 
A third related charge is that far from being a system that speaks to the whole of society, 
multiculturalism, unlike interculturalism, speaks only to and for the minorities within it and, 
therefore, also fails to appreciate the necessary wider framework for its success.  As Goodhart 
(2004) has protested, multiculturalism is a-symmetrical in that it not only places too great 
an emphasis upon difference and diversity, upon what divides us more than what unites us, 
but also that it ignores the needs of majorities.  It thus encourages resentment, 
fragmentation and disunity.  This can be prevented or overcome, as Alev (2007) and other 
commentators put it, through invocations of interculturalism that promote community 
cohesion on a local level, and more broadly through an interculturalism that encourages the 
subscription to national citizenship identities as forms of meta-membership: 
 
Interculturalism is a better term than multiculturalism. It emphasises interaction 
and participation of citizens in a common society, rather than cultural differences 
and different cultures existing next to each other without necessarily much contact 
or participative interaction. Interculturalism is therefore equivalent to mutual 
integration. 
 
While multiculturalism boils down to celebrating difference, interculturalism is 
DERXW XQGHUVWDQGLQJ HDFK RWKHU¶V FXOWXUHV VKDULQJ WKHP DQG ILQGLQJ FRPPRQ
ground on which people can become more integrated.4 
 
These common grounds embody a kind of commonality that members of society need to 
have and which is said to have been obscured by a focus on difference. It is argued that 
European societies and states have been too laissez-faire in promoting commonality and this 
must now be remedied (Joppke, 2004), hence the introduction of measures such as swearing 
of oaths of allegiance at naturalisation ceremonies, language proficiency requirements when 
seeking citizenship, and citizenship education in schools, amongst other things.  What such 
sentiment ignores is how all forms of prescribed unity, including civic unity, usually retain a 
majoritarian bias that places the burden of adaptation upon the minority, and so is 
LQFRQVLVWHQW ZLWK LQWHUFXOWXUDOLVP¶V DOOHJHG FRPPLWPHQW WR µPXWXDO LQWHJUDWLRQ¶ DV SXW
IRUZDUGLQ$OHY¶VDFFRXQW 
 
$V 9LHW %DGHU   UHPLQGV XV µDOO FLYic and democratic cultures are inevitably 
embedded into specific ethno-QDWLRQDO DQG UHOLJLRXV KLVWRULHV¶  :HUH ZH WR DVVHVV WKH
normative premise of this view, however, we would inevitably encounter a dense literature 
elaborating the continuing disputes over the interactions between the civic, political and 
ethnic dimensions in the creation of nations, national identities and their relationship to 
each other and to non-UDWLRQDOµLQWXLWLYH¶DQGµHPRWLRQDO¶SXOOVRIDQFHVWULHVDQGFXOWXUHVDQG
so forth. ChieIDPRQJVWWKHVHLVZKHWKHURUQRW µQDWLRQV¶DUHVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOIRUPDWLRQV
developed in the proliferation of modern nation-states from the 18th Century onwards, or 
whether they constitute social and political formations ± RU µHWKQLHV¶ - bearing an older 
pedigree that may be obscured by a modernist focus. What is most relevant to our 
                                                          
4 1HZ6WDUW-XQH,W¶VDOOLQWKHPL[
http://www.newstartmag.co.uk/features/article/its-all-in-the-mix 
GLVFXVVLRQ KRZHYHU LV QRW WKH GHEDWH EHWZHHQ GLIIHUHQW FDPSV RI µPRGHUQLVW¶ µHWKQR-
V\PEROLVW¶ DQG µSULPRUGLDOLVW¶ SURWDJRQLVWV DPRQJVW RWKHUV EXW WKH ZD\V LQ ZKLFK
miQRULWLHV¶GLIIHUHQFHVDUHFRQFHLYHGLQFRQWHPSRUDU\IRUPRIPHWD-unity.5   
 
It is perhaps telling, however, that much of the literature on national identity in particular 
has tended to be retrospective to the extent that such contemporary concerns do not enjoy a 
widespread appeal in scholarly accounts of national identity (while the opposite could be 
said to be true of the literature on citizenship).  This tendency is not limited to academic 
arenas and one of the curiosities in popular articulations of national identity is the purchase 
that these accounts garner from a recourse to tradition, history, and the idea of a common 
past (Calhoun, 1994).  One implication is that national identities can frequently reflect 
GHVLUHV WR DXWKHQWLFDWH WKH SDVW µWR VHOHFW from all that has gone before that which is 
GLVWLQFWLYHµWUXO\RXUV¶DQGWKHUHE\WRPDUNRXWDXQLTXHVKDUHGGHVWLQ\¶6PLWK 
 
It was this very assessment which, at the turn of the millennium, informed the Commission 
on Multi-Ethnic Britain¶V&0(%FKDUDFWHULVDWLRQRI%ULWLVKQDWLRQDOLGHQWLW\DVSRWHQWLDOO\
µEDVHG RQ JHQHUDOLVDWLRQV >WKDW@ LQYROYH D VHOHFWLYH DQG VLPSOLILHG DFFRXQW RI D FRPSOH[
KLVWRU\¶&KDLUHGE\%KLNKX3DUHNKLWIHDUHGVXFKDQDFFRXQWZRXOGEHRQHLQZKLFKµ>P@DQ\
compOLFDWHG VWUDQGV DUH UHGXFHG WR D VLPSOH WDOH RI HVVHQWLDO DQG HQGXULQJ QDWLRQDO XQLW\¶
FPPG  S ¶ ,W ZDV SUHFLVHO\ WKLV WHQGHQF\ WKDW LQIRUPHG WKH &0(%¶V DODUP DW KRZ
invocations of national identity potentially force ethnic minorities into a predicament not of 
their making: one in which majorities are conflated with the nation and where national 
identity is promoted as a reflection of this state of affairs (because national identities are 
assumed to be cognates of monistic nations).  For in not easily fitting into a majoritarian 
account of national identity, or either being unable or unwilling to be reduced to or 
                                                          
5 Though this concern perhaps relies on something from the cultural-imaginary form of 
µPRGHUQLVW¶DUJXPHQWPRVWDVVRFLDWHd with Anderson (1983). Moreover, for a study of how 
this is happening in non-political urban contexts, see Kyrikiades, Virdee and Modood 
(2009).  
DVVLPLODWHG LQWR D SUHVFULEHG SXEOLF FXOWXUH PLQRULW\ µGLIIHUHQFHV¶ PD\ WKHUHIRUH EHFRPH
variously negatively conceived.  Such concerns have not been limited to the UK, however, 
and may be observed in the Intercultural Dialog Commission (2005) set up by the federal 
government in Belgium to facilitate a transition in the federal level emphasis from 
integration to cultural diversity.  This identified several historical tendencies, concerning (i) 
a political pluralism that facilitated working class emancipation and wider political 
consultation; (ii) philosophical pluralism that incrementally led to the official recognition of 
various public religions (Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Islamic, and Anglican) and non-
religion; and (iii) community pluralism as stemming from Flemish and Walloon movements 
that created the current federal State of Belgium. Importantly, the Commissioners 
underscored a further form of pluralism as the next step: (iv) cultural pluralism.  More 
precisely they insisted that integration issues should take into account relevant cultural 
dimensions and that it no longer makes sense to qualify the descendents of migrants as 
µPLJUDQW¶ RU µDOORFKWRQH¶ UHVSHFWLYHO\ XVHG LQ WKH :DOORRQ DQG )OHPLVK UHJLRQV LQVWHDG
µFXOWXUDO PLQRULWLHV¶ ZRXOG EH D PXFK PRUH UHOHYDQW GHILQLWLRQ  7KH UHSRUW RQ WKH ZKROH
focussed its conclusions on the lack of cultural recognition in a manner that invited the 
criticism that the Commission had been highly influenced by communitarian theories 
LQVWHDGRIµWU\LQJWRGHYHORSFLYLFUHVSRQVLELOLW\DQGFRPPRQFLWL]HQVKLSUDWKHUWKDQWKLQNLQJ
DERXWDQLQFUHDVLQJVSDFHIRUFXOWXUDOFRPPXQLWLHV¶/D/LEUH-6-2005). 
 
One scholarly intervention in this vein can be found in 0RGRRG¶V D UHVWDWHPHQW RI
multiculturalism as a civic idea that can be tied to an inclusive national identity, and some of 
the responses this has elicited (see Modood, 2007b), helps cast light upon this debate. This 
concern was present in his Not Easy Being British: Colour, Culture and Citizenship first 
published in 1992 where, not unusually among advocates of multiculturalism, Modood 
emphasised the role of citizenship in fostering commonality across differences, before 
recasting part of this civic inclusion as proceeding through claims making upon, and 
therefore reformulating, national identities. In his more contemporary formulation he puts 
this thus: 
 
[I]t does not make sense to encourage strong multicultural or minority identities 
and weak common or national identities; strong multicultural identities are a good 
thing ± they are not intrinsically divisive, reactionary or subversive ± but they need 
the complement of a framework of vibrant, dynamic, national narratives and the 
ceremonies and rituals which give expression to a national identity. It is clear that 
minority identities are capable of exerting an emotional pull for the individuals for 
whom they are important. Multicultural citizenship, if it is to be equally attractive 
to the same individuals, requires a comparable counterbalancing emotional pull 
(Modood, 2007b). 
 
This restatement contains at least two key points that are central to the preceding discussion. 
The first concerns an advocacy and continuity of earlier forms of multiculturalism that have 
sought to accommodate collective identities and incorporate differences into the 
mainstream. These differences are not only tolerated but respected, and include the turning 
RID µQHJDWLYH¶GLIIHUHQFHLQWRD µSRVLWLYH¶GLIIHUHQFHLQDZD\WKDW LVSUHVHQWHGLQWKHHWKQLF
pride currents as elements of racial equality. The second is to place a greater emphasis upon 
the unifying potential of an affirmation of a renegotiated and inclusive national identity 
therein. While the latter point is welcomed by some commentators who had previously 
formed part of the pluralistic left, the bringing of previously marginalised groups into the 
societal mainstream is, at best, greeted more ambivalently. 
 
Illiberalism and culture 
 
The fourth charge is that multiculturalism lends itself to illiberality and relativism, such that 
there is often uncertainty surrounding the tackling of culturally specific practices that 
LQIULQJHSHRSOH¶VULJKWVVXFKDVIRUFHGPDUULDJH¶%5$3 ,QWHUFXOWXUDOLVPKDV
the capacity to criticise and censure culture (as part of a process of intercultural dialogue), 
aQGVRLVPRUHOLNHO\WRHPSKDVLVHWKHSURWHFWLRQRILQGLYLGXDOULJKWV,Q%RXFKDUG¶V
467) terms: 
Interculturalism is built on the basic wager of democracy, that is, a capacity to reach 
consensus on forms of peaceful co-existence that preserve basic values and make 
URRPIRUWKHIXWXUHRIDOOFLWL]HQV« 
 
In Europe this charge clearly assumed a role in the backlash against multiculturalism since, 
as Kymlicka (E  GHVFULEHV µLW LV YHU\ GLIILFXOW WR JHW VXSSRUW IRU PXOWLFXOWXUDOLVP
policies if the groups that are the main beneficiaries of these policies are perceived as carriers 
RI LOOLEHUDOFXOWXUDOSUDFWLFHV WKDWYLRODWHQRUPVRIKXPDQULJKWV¶  This view is particularly 
evident in the debates concerning the accommodation of religious minorities, especially 
when the religion in question is perceived to take a conservative line on issues of gender 
equality, sexual orientation and progressive politics generally (something that has arguably 
led some commentators who may otherwise sympathize with religious minorities to argue 
that it is difficult to view them as victims when they may themselves be potential oppressors 
(see Meer and Modood, 2009b)).  
 
.\POLFNDEQDUURZVGRZQWKLVREVHUYDWLRQIXUWKHULQKLVFRQFOXVLRQWKDWµLIZHSXW
Western democracies on a continuum in terms of the proportion of immigrants who are 
Muslim, I think this would provide a good indicator of public opposition to 
mulWLFXOWXUDOLVP¶As Bhikhu Parekh (2006: 180-1) notes, this can be traced to a perception 
WKDW0XVOLPVDUHµFROOHFWLYLVWLQWROHUDQWDXWKRULWDULDQLOOLEHUDODQGWKHRFUDWLF¶DQGWKDWWKH\
XVH WKHLU IDLWK DV µD VHOI-conscious public statement, not quietly held personal faith but a 
matter of identity which they must jealously guard and loudly and repeatedly proclaim . . . 
QRWRQO\WRUHPLQGWKHPRIZKRWKH\DUHEXWDOVRWRDQQRXQFHWRRWKHUVZKDWWKH\VWDQGIRU¶
It is thus unsurprising to learn that some attitude surveys in Britain report that 77 per cent of 
SHRSOHDUHFRQYLQFHGWKDW µ,VODPKDVDORWRIIDQDWLFDOIROORZHUV¶SHUFHQWFRQVLGHULW µWR
KDYHPRUHWRGRZLWKWKHPLGGOHDJHVWKDQWKHPRGHUQZRUOG¶DQGSHUFHQWEHOLHYHWKDW
,VODPµWUHDWVZRPHQEDGO\¶)LHOG 
 
For these reasons Muslim claims making has been characterised as specifically ambitious 
and difficult to accommodate (Joppke, 2004; 2007; Moore, 2004; 2006; Pew, 2006; Policy 
Exchange, 2007). This is particularly the case when Muslims are perceived to be ± often 
uniquely ± in contravention of liberal discourses of individual rights and secularism 
(Hansen, 2006; Hutton, 2007; Toynbee, 2005) and is exemplified by the way in which 
visible Muslim practices such as veiling have in public discourses been reduced to and 
conflated with alleged Muslim practices such as forced marriages, female genital mutilation, 
a rejection of positive law in favour of criminal sharia law and so on. This suggests a radical 
µRWKHUQHVV¶ DERXW 0XVOLPV and an illiberality about multiculturalism, since the latter is 
alleged to license these practices 
 
It is difficult, however, not to view this as a knee-jerk reaction that condemns religious 
identities per se, rather than examines them on a case-by-case basis, while on the other hand 
assuming that ethnic identities are free of illiberalism. This is empirically problematic given 
that some of the problematic practices are not religious but cultural. Clitoridectomy, for 
example, is often cited as an illiberal practice in the discussions we are referring to. It is, 
however, a cultural practice among various ethnic groups, and yet has little support from any 
religion. So to favour ethnicity and problematise religion is a reflection of a secularist bias 
that has alienated many religionists, especially Muslims, from multiculturalism. It is much 
EHWWHUWRDFNQRZOHGJHWKDWWKHµPXOWL¶ LQPXOWLFXOWXUDOLVPZLOOHQFRPSDVVGLIIHUHQWNLQGVRI
JURXSVDQGGRHVQRWLWVHOISULYLOHJHDQ\RQHNLQGEXWWKDWµUHFRJQLWLRQ¶VKRXOG be given to the 
identities that marginalized groups themselves value and find strength in, whether these be 
racial, religious or ethnic (Modood, 2007b). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter provides an entry point in developing a discussion on the relationship between 
interculturalism and multiculturalism. The question it raises is to what extent the present 
criteria proposed by advocates of interculturalism, in positively contrasting it with 
multiculturalism, are persuasive.  In addressing this we maintain that whilst interculturalism 
and multiculturalism share much as approaches concerned with recognising cultural 
GLYHUVLW\ WKH DQVZHU WR /HQWLQ¶V   TXHVWLRQ - is interculturalism merely an 
µXSGDWHG YHUVLRQ¶ RI PXOWLFXOWXUDOLVP" ± LV LQ WKH PDLQ µQR¶  That is to say that while 
DGYRFDWHV RI LQWHUFXOWXUDOLVP ZLVK WR HPSKDVLVH LW¶V SRVLWLYH TXDOLWLHV LQ WHUPV RI
encouraging communication, recognising dynamic identities, promoting unity, and 
challenging illiberality, each of these qualities already feature (and are on occasion 
foundational) in multiculturalism. Moreover, multiculturalism presently surpasses 
interculturalism as a political orientation that is able to recognise that social life consists of 
individuals and groups, and that both need to be provided for in the formal and informal 
distribution of powers, as well as reflected in an ethical conception of citizenship, and not 
just an instrumental one.   As such we conclude that until interculturalism as a political 
discourse is able to offer an original perspective, one that can speak to a variety of concerns 
emanating from complex identities and matters of equality and diversity in a more 
persuasive manner than at present, it cannot  at present, intellectually at least, eclipse 
multiculturalism. 
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